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Abstract 
 
Although still low for European standards, investments in Social Assistance (SA) transfers 
in Turkey have been increasing in recent years. The government is expanding access to 
subsidized health for individuals in the informal sector through a rapid expansion of the 
Green Card program. Generous non-contributory programs, such as the Green Card, may 
create perverse incentives for individuals to join or remain in the informal sector as they 
can access free services without paying taxes and/or contributions, thus potentially 
being able to get higher “net” labor earnings than in the formal sector. Despite the fact 
that the Green Card is a large and generous program offered to individuals in the 
informal sector, empirical analysis in this report does not find an actual impact of the 
program (or of its rapid expansion) on informality. The reason behind this finding is the 
existence of a very large differential in wages between formal and informal workers 
explained by differences worker’s productivity. Low-wage workers facing the possibility 
to move from the informal sector to the formal sector would have strong incentives to do 
so even if this would imply losing all SA benefits. As such, the expected monetary and job 
security gains of having a formal job dominate those of having an informal job even 
after accounting for SA transfers.       
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1. Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this note is to study the incentives created by the various social 
assistance/insurance programs in Turkey, especially the Green Card, in the worker’s 
choice of employment sector (formal vs. informal). SA, defined broadly, is often viewed 
as a factor determining labor supply choices, including whether to work formally or 
informally (Table 1). For instance, SA transfers and subsidized health are often given to 
individuals who are unemployed and/or unregistered in social security. If transfers 
constitute a large share of the total income received by beneficiaries (or if services 
provided are expensive to acquire), individuals may have incentives to not register in 
social security and/or to declare that they are unemployed.  
 
 
Table 1: Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) and other SA Programs on labor 
market outcomes [A review of the Literature]   
Impact on Author Main Findings 
Children Labor 
Supply 
   
Glewwe and 
Olinto  (2004) 
PRAF in Honduras: Households that receive CCT are less 
dependent of receiving income from their children (income 
effect). CCT can also increase school enrollment (condition for 
the transfer). Therefore, CCT may reduce child labor.  
Empirical evidence suggests no significant impact of CCT on 
child work. 
Attanasio et al. 
(2006) 
Familias en Acción in Colombia: No significant impact of CCT 
on child work 
 Skoufias and 
Parker (2001) 
Edmonds and 
Schady  (2008) 
Oportunidades in Mexico and Bono de Desarrollo Humano in 
Ecuador: Significant  negative impact of CCT on child work 
Yap, Sedlacek, and 
Orazem, (2008) 
Peti in Brazil: Significant  negative impact of CCT on child work 
Adult Labor Supply 
 
Parker and 
Skoufias, (2000); 
Skoufias and di 
Maro, (2006) 
Oportunidades in Mexico: CCT recipients may believe that, to 
continue to be categorized as “poor” and eligible for the 
programs, they need reduce their labor supply (price effect). 
Also, if leisure is a normal good, disincentive effects on adult 
labor supply are expected (income effect).  
Empirical evidence suggests no significant impact of CCT on 
adult labor supply. 
Maluccio and 
Flores (2005) 
Evidence for Nicaragua suggest significant negative effects of 
CCT on male labor supply but not on female 
Hoynes (1996) Empirical evidence for the AFDC-UP program in the US 
suggests that labor supply and welfare participation among 
two-parent families are highly responsive to changes in the 
benefit structure of the program, suggesting sizable work 
disincentives. 
Choice of 
Employment sector 
(formal vs. informal) 
Barros (2006) Empirical evidence for Seguro Popular (subsidized health for 
informal workers) in Mexico shows no significant impact of 
the program on the size of informal sector and labor force 
participation.   
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Source: Shady (2009) and Authors compilation 
A common concern regarding SA transfers is that they can introduce perverse 
incentives. Although SA transfers in Turkey remain low for European standards, 
investment in these programs has been increasing in recent years. In particular, the 
government is expanding access to subsidized health for individuals in the informal 
sector through the rapid expansion of the Green Card program. The Green Card 
program displays some features that could potentially affect workers decisions to 
remain in the informal sector: it is rather generous in terms of per-capita transfer 
allocations, it covers a significant share of the poor (about 50 percent of all individuals in 
the poorest quintile), and its eligibility requires individuals to not be registered in social 
security (i.e. beneficiaries need to work in the informal sector or to be unemployed). 
Restricting SA programs to un-registered workers is a commonly used strategy to target 
the most vulnerable groups. However, generous non-contributory programs may create 
perverse incentives for individuals to join or remain in the informal sector as they can 
access free health services without paying taxes and/or contributions thus being able to 
get higher “net” labor earnings. This phenomenon is especially relevant in countries 
with high levels of social security contributions, as it is the case in Turkey (Betcherman 
and Pages, 2008).  
 
Previous literature has found only marginal effects of non-contributory health 
programs on informality.  Colombia and Mexico are two middle-income economies in 
Latin America that seem to share some similarities with Turkey relevant for this study. 
Colombia and Mexico displayed a large share of total employment not registered in 
social security, at about 55 percent in 2006 (World Bank, 2007) and they have a large 
and comprehensive non-contributory health insurance system: the Plan Obligatorio de 
Salud Subsidiado (POSS) in Colombia and the Seguro Popular in Mexico. Two recent 
papers analyze the impact of these two programs on informality. Camacho and Conover 
(2007) analyze the effect of the 1993 Health Reform in Colombia. The reform introduced 
the POSS program, which provides free access to health insurance and medications for 
individuals who do not have a formal job. In order to be eligible for the POSS programs, 
individuals need to be below a certain score (called the SISBEN score), which is a proxy 
Camacho & 
Conover (2007) 
The study evaluates the Subsidized Regime in Colombia and 
finds a significant higher probability of being informal for 
people below the eligibility threshold relative to people above 
it (suggesting that the awareness of the expansion of the 
subsidized regime increases the probability of being informal). 
However, it does not provide enough evidence to assess how 
much informality increased as a result of expanding the health 
subsidies for informal workers after the Health Reform of 
1993 since there is no information for the counterfactual 
distribution (in absence of the reform, how many workers 
that were informal in the period pre-reform could have been 
formal today).  
Gasparini, 
Haimovich, and 
Olivieri (2006) 
This study finds some evidence of an informality-incentive 
effect due to Jefes de Hogar (a rather large cash transfer to 
unemployed household heads) in Argentina. 
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means testing mechanism that the Colombian government employs to identify the poor. 
In order to assess the impact of the program on informality, the authors analyze 
informality rates above and below the SISBEN score and fond only a very small jump of 
the probability of being informal at the eligibility threshold, suggesting a moderate 
impact of the POSS program on informality.  
 
Barros (2008) analyzes a large expansion of the government-funded healthcare for 
people employed in the informal sector (Seguro Popular) in Mexico in year 2002.  The 
author finds no impact of the program’s expansion on informality. The author argues 
that a plausible explanation for this result is the low quality of the healthcare provided 
under Seguro Popular. This last result highlights a key dimension: the perceived value of 
the benefits provided by the program. Indeed, workers would be more prone to alter 
their behavior if the benefits of the program are large. In this respect, Gasparini et al. 
(2007) analyze this topic for a large poverty-alleviation program in Argentina named 
Programa Jefes de Hogar (PJH). This program provides cash transfers to unemployed 
household heads. In practice, the difficulty in monitoring the unemployment 
requirement for informal (unregistered) workers would imply a disincentive for the 
program participants to search for a formal job. By applying matching techniques to 
panel data, they find some evidence on the informality bias of the program when the 
value of the cash transfer is relatively high compared to wages in the formal labor 
market. However, the effect of the distortion vanished when -- with time – real wages in 
the formal sector went up substantially while the value of the PJH transfer remained 
fixed.    
 
2. A Brief Review of Social Assistance Programs in Turkey 
 
SA in Turkey is only a small component of the social protection system in the country. 
The social protection system in Turkey has historically been based on Bismarckian 
principles, whereby social insurance (mainly pensions, health insurance, disability 
benefits, and unemployment insurance) are all linked to employment in the formal 
sector within what is called “the contributory system” (Aran, 2008). The contributory 
system, as its name suggest, is mostly financed by employee and employer’s social 
contributions at the work place. On the other hand, the non-contributory system in 
Turkey, which provides some services to the poorest segments of the population, has 
traditionally been smaller and characterized by limited coverage and service provision. 
Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 1, Turkey is one of the countries in ECA spending the least 
on non-contributory SA (at 0.90 percent of GDP vs. an average of 2.5 percent of GDP in 
OECD countries).   
 
Figure 1: Turkey is one of the ECA countries that invests the least on SA  
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Source: Lindert (2009). Data for years 2005/2007; data for Turkey is for year 2007 
 
But spending on SA in Turkey is growing rapidly. Data in Figure 2 indicate that spending 
on SA in Turkey as a share of total government spending has been increasing rapidly in 
recent years (from 0.93 to 2.25 percent). Such an increase was mainly driven by a rapid 
increase in spending for non-contributory health insurance (i.e. Green Card).  Indeed, 
expenditure on the Green Card program increased by roughly 3 fold between years 
2004 and 2007 (from 1,691 to 4,570 million YTL in real 2007 currency). Expenditure on 
other SA programs remained low and rather unchanged.  
 
Figure 2: Expenditures on SA as a percentage of total Government Spending (%) 
 
Source: processed from Aran (2008) 
 
Table 2: The Green Card program constitutes the main budget item for SA spending in 
Turkey 
Total Non-contributive SA 2004 2005 2006 2007 
- 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 
Tajikistan
Azerbaijan
Turkey
Georgia
Poland
Albania 
Kazakhstan
Romania
Serbia
Kosovo
Kyrgyzstan
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Belarus
Estonia
Latvia
Armenia
Moldova
Russia
Macedonia
Uzbekistan
OECD
Ukraine
Hungary
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Croatia
Public Spending on Social Assistance, % of GDP
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
2004 2005 2006 2007
Greencard
In-kind transfers 
Family and Children's (CCT)
Old age/dissability benefits
0.93%
1.46%
2.03%
2.25%
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In Million of 2007 real YTL  1,691 2,549 3,661 4,570 
% Old age/disability benefits 6.5% 5.0% 4.4% 5.6% 
% Family and Children's (CCT) 10.5% 7.9% 6.3% 6.0% 
% Green Card 81.0% 84.6% 86.4% 85.4% 
% In-kind transfers  2.0% 2.5% 2.8% 3.0% 
Source: processed from Aran (2008) 
 
The SA system in Turkey is composed mainly by four programs: old-age/disability 
benefits, in-kind transfers, family and children’s benefits, and non-contributory health 
insurance (Green Card).  The Green Card is the largest non-contributory program, 
accounting for about 85 percent of the SA budget in year 2007 (Table 2). Non-
contributory SA programs are generally managed by the Social Security Administration 
and the Social Solidarity Fund. Programs are generally run by provincial offices where 
program eligibility is determined by boards. Eligibility is generally determined in an ad-
hoc basis. According to the law, beneficiaries are eligible to most SA programs if they 
are not registered in social security and live in household with a per-capita income 
below one third of the net minimum wage. In practice, local boards determine eligibility 
based on their knowledge of the people in the community. In some cases, boards use 
ad-hoc proxy-means testing methods (e.g. boards disqualify individuals who own a car 
and/or youngsters) and use cross validation with data from the social security 
administration. A brief description of the main SA programs in Turkey (objective, 
eligibility, and management) is provided in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Main Non-contributory SA Programs in Turkey 
 Program Description 
Old-age/disability 
benefits 
Brief Description Helps individuals who are over 65, poor with a monthly 
subsistence salary. Individuals not over 65 but who are disable 
can benefit from this program. 
Regulation Started in 1976, by Law. No. 2022 and together with Law No. 
5378 eligibility conditions were specified. 
Eligibility Beneficiary should be over 65 (or disable) and should not 
benefit from any income/salary under any name from any of 
the Social security organization.  He/she should prove his/her 
neediness with the documents to be obtained by themselves 
from the provincial or county administration board. 
Management Social Security Administration. Funding for this program comes 
directly from the State's Budget. 
In-kind transfers Brief Description The program provides mainly in-kind assistance to poor 
households not covered by other social security schemes. The 
aid provided consists of food, fuel, housing aid as well as 
scholarships for higher education, and transportation of 
disabled students to school.     
Regulation Law No. 3294. dated 29 May 1986  
Eligibility Beneficiaries must be poor (as defined by the municipal board) 
and shall not receive benefits from any social security 
institution established.  
Management  Social Assistance and Solidarity Promotion Fund. Funding 
comes from the Social Assistance and Solidarity Promotion Fund 
(at the municipal level) and from private foundations. 
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Family and 
Children's Benefits 
(CCT) 
Brief Description This CCT program in Turkey was initiated in 2001 under the 
Social Risk Mitigation Project supported by the World Bank. In 
2001, the program was piloted in 6 provinces and then was 
scaled up nationwide between 2003 and 2006. The program 
provides cash transfers for education and health support. 
 Eligibility The health component of the program targets mothers of 
children between the ages 0-6, as well as pregnant women with 
the level of benefits around 17 YTL per month. The education 
component of the program provides stipends for children in 
basic education (grades 1-8) and senior secondary school 
(grades 10-12) with cash benefits ranging from 18 YTL (for boys) 
to 22 YTL (for girls) per month for 12 months in the year. There 
is not limit on the number of children who benefit from this 
program per household. The families registered under any 
other social security program are not eligible under the CCT. 
 Management The Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund is the institution that 
is in charge of distributing the cash benefits through its 931 
local branches at the district level.   
Source: Processed from Aran (2008) and SSI (2008) 
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Table 3: cont.  
 Program Description 
Non-contributory 
Heath Insurance 
(Green Card) 
Brief Description Since 1992, the objective of the Green Card program has been 
to meet the medical expenses of the poor who are not covered 
by other social security institutions. Started in 1992, the 
program covers: (i) outpatient treatment, examination, tests 
and medicines in health care facilities, (ii) prenatal care and 
delivery expenses ,(iii) emergency medical care.  Expenses on 
pharmaceuticals do require beneficiary's co-payment. 
 Regulation The program came into effect under Law No: 3816 in 1992. 
 Eligibility Beneficiaries should not be covered under other social security 
institution and shall not have income or income share within 
the family less than 1/3 of the minimum wage excluding taxes 
and social insurance premiums.    
 Management The targeting of the Green Cards is carried out at the local level 
through provincial and district administration boards. The 
budget allocation for the programs is assigned to the Ministry of 
Health so as to cover the cost of health services to be provided. 
Source: Processed from Aran (2008) and SSI(2008) 
 
Although Non-contributory SA programs are small in size and coverage, they seem to 
be very well targeted. Previous findings using data from the 2006 Turkish Household 
Budget Survey (Aran, 2008) indicate that even though SA transfers in Turkey are low in 
size and coverage, they are very well targeted. Indeed, most of the benefits of the non-
contributory SA programs in Turkey accrue among households in the bottom two 
quintiles.  
 
Figure 3: Turkey has two of the best targeted programs in the ECA region.  
 
Source: Linder (2009) and Nguyen and Sundaram (2009) 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Russia Child allowances
Uzbekistan SA for low income
Armenia FB Prog
Hungary Aid Progs
Albania NE Prog
Kyrgyzstan UMB
Kosovo SA
Poland SW benefits
Serbia MOP
Azerbaijan TSA
Bulgaria GMI
Lithuania Social Benefit
Georgia TSA
Croatia Support Allowance
Estonia MT Benefits
Turkey CCT
Turkey Green Card
Ukraine XP program
Romania GMI
Share of Transfers Accrued in the Poorest Quintile
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The Green Card program is particularly progressive, with 83 percent of its benefits 
accrued in the bottom 2 quintiles (Aran, 2008).  Furthermore, the Green Card program 
and the Family and Children’s benefits CCT are two of the best targeted programs in the 
ECA region (Figure 3).  
 
3. Social Assistance as a Determinant of Sector Choice.  
 
There are three important dimensions that need to be considered when analyzing the 
impact of SA programs on informality: generosity, coverage, and eligibility design. 
When analyzing the impact of SA programs on informality it is important to understand 
the particular incentives that programs may create on beneficiaries. An important 
dimension for analysis is the programs’ generosity. Indeed, highly generous programs 
(i.e. those with transfers that could constitute a large share of household’s income) 
generally create welfare dependency and could adversely affect labor market decisions 
of beneficiaries. A program’s coverage (i.e. share of the target population actually 
benefiting from the program) is also an important factor as it can potentially influence 
aggregate outcomes in localities where the program is implemented. The third 
dimension concerns program eligibility design. If a programs eligibility design requires 
recipients to be unemployed or informal, for example, the program may create 
incentives for the recipient to remain unemployed or informal for a longer period than if 
the program did not exist. In Turkey, the eligibility design could potentially contribute to 
increase informality and/or to extend individuals prevalence in the informal sector since 
all SA benefits require recipients to be outside the contributory sector of the economic 
(i.e. in the informal sector).    
 
For ECA standards, overall non-contributory SA transfers in Turkey display “average” 
generosity among the poor. A generally accepted measure to proxy generosity of SA 
programs in a country (Lindert, 2009) is the size of SA transfers as a share of total 
household income for households in the poorest quintile. As displayed in the left panel 
of Figure 4, such share in Turkey is at 15.8 percent. Compared to other countries in the 
ECA region, this share seems neither high nor low. But generosity of SA has been 
increasing rapidly since 2003. The right panel of Figure 4 shows SA transfers as a share 
of household income (by decile) for the years 2003 and 2006. The figure indicates that 
SA transfers are an important source of total household income for household in the 
poorest 3 deciles. As expected, SA transfers are a negligible source of income for 
households in the middle and upper deciles. Estimates also indicate that SA transfers 
have become a much more important source of income in 2006 as compared to 2003, 
especially among households in the poorest two deciles.   
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Figure 4: But generosity of SA Programs in Turkey increased significantly between 
years 2003 and 2006. 
 
 
Source: Nguyen and Sundaram (2009) and authors’ own calculations using 2003 and 
2006 HBS data 
 
The Green Card transfers account for 82 to 92 percent of all SA transfers among the 
poor. Data indicate that the Green Card is the only SA program in Turkey with a high 
level of generosity among the poor. Table 4 contains information on income from SA 
transfers per month for poor households in Turkey (i.e. the bottom 30 percent of the 
population sorted by per-capita consumption).  Results indicate that SA transfers 
account for 23.5, 10.8, and 5.4 percent of the overall income for households in the first, 
second, and third per-capita consumption deciles. Furthermore, results indicate that 
Green Card transfers account for 82 to 92 percent of all SA assistance transfers. The 
generosity of the remaining SA programs (other than the Green Card) is rather limited. 
Indeed, all other SA programs combined (CCTs, old-age/disability benefits, and in-kind 
transfers) account for at most 2 percent of the overall income of poor households. 
Therefore, the impact of these programs on labor market outcomes (including sector’s 
choice) is likely to be limited (and perhaps negligible) (Table 4) (Box 1)  
 
Table 4: Composition and size of SA transfers among poor households in Turkey 
Consumption Decile 1 2 3 
Estimated Average Income (YTL / month) 932.94 1361.34 1820.58 
Estimated Average Social Assistance (YTL / month) 219.31 146.47 98.29 
% Old Age Benefit 4.68 7.34 7.01 
% Family and Children CCT  0.36 0.38 4.36 
% In-Kind Government Transfers 3.47 4.58 6.65 
% Green Card Program (subsidized health) 91.49 87.69 81.98 
SA transfers as % of income 23.5 10.8 5.4 
Non-Green Card SA transfers as % of income 2.00 1.32 0.97 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using 2006 HBS data 
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Box 1: Impact of the CCT Program on Employment Outcomes in Turkey 
The specific objectives of the CCT in Turkey are to increase school attendance rates for the poor, decrease 
dropout rates, increase immunization coverage, and enhance the utilization of health facilities for the 1.1 
million target beneficiaries. A concern among policymakers and stakeholders about cash transfer 
programs is that they might create a disincentive for people to participate in the labor market.  Given 
work insecurities and fluctuating income, the thought is that households will become reliant on steady 
CCT money. In 2007, The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) produced a report of an 
impact evaluation of the CCT program in Turkey.  
Concerning the effects of the program on labor market outcomes, the IFPRI study found that CCT does not 
appear to have any impact on work patterns among adults (employment, unemployment, or labor 
participation). Beneficiaries generally follow similar work patterns as they did before the implementation 
of the CCT program.  Impact of the CCT on child labor appears modest.  Children continue to value work in 
the same way they did before, and adults continue relying on it not only as a coping strategy but as a way 
to increase the marketability of their children.   
 
The Green Card program displays some features (in relation to generosity and 
coverage) that suggest it could affect beneficiary’s employment decisions. Figure 5 
analyzes targeting performance, coverage, and generosity of non-contributory SA 
program in Turkey using a three dimensional figure by which the main results of a 
benefit-incidence analysis can be easily visualized.  Each dimension of the figure 
represents a different indicator. The vertical axis represents the share of the poor that 
benefit from the income source (coverage). The horizontal axis represents the share of 
the total program expenditures that reach the poor (targeting). The size of the bubble, 
which represents the generosity of the program, is proportional to the average per-
capita transfer “received” by households (a larger bubble indicates a larger per-capita 
transfer in monetary terms).  
 
The Green Card is the most Generous SA program:  The large bubble on the upper right 
corner on Figure 5 represents the size of a perfectly targeted transfer that would be 
sufficient to eradicate poverty (the coverage and the targeting among the poor would 
be 100 percent, and the transfer would provide to each poor household exactly what is 
needed to lift the household above the poverty line). The size of this perfect transfer 
would be equivalent to YTL$192 per-capita per month and it is calculated as the poverty 
gap times the poverty line. In this note, we assume that 30 percent of the population in 
Turkey is poor.1 As illustrated by the graph, most SA transfers in Turkey, except the 
Green Card, seem quite small as compared to the perfect transfer; indicating, as 
mentioned before low levels of generosity. Indeed, even if all SA transfers in Turkey 
were pulled together in a single program/transfer, they could not amount to the size of 
the perfect transfer. In particular, adding together all SA transfers would account only to 
YTL$66.9 per-capita per month (vs. YTL192 per capita per month; which is the average 
amount needed to eradicate poverty).  
 
                                                 
1
 Unfortunately, available data did not contain regional dummies and/or regional price deflators. As such, 
poverty calculations resulting from the data would not be consistent with those of TUIK.   
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Figure 5: Targeting, Coverage, and Generosity of SA programs in Turkey [2006] 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using 2006 HBS data. Targeting and coverage of 
Family and Children’s CCT from Lindert (2009) 
 
The Green Card is the best targeted SA program in Turkey: The horizontal axis in Figure 5 
represents the share of various types of transfers that reach the poor. Given that the 
poor represent about 30 percent of the population, a share higher than 30 percent in 
the horizontal axis mean that proportionately to their weight in the population, the poor 
benefit  more than the non-poor (on average) from the transfer. Results indicate that all 
SA transfers in Turkey are being allocated progressively. Note that the Green Card is the 
best targeted program in Turkey with approximately 77 percent of all its benefits 
targeted to the poor.  
 
The Green Card is the SA program with the highest coverage: The vertical axis in Figure 5 
provides data on the share of the poor that benefit from various types of transfers. 
Results indicate that 50 percent of all poor households receive Green Card (about 10.2 
million individuals). This share is quite high as compared to coverage rates among the of 
other SA programs (28 percent for in-kind transfers, 6 percent for Old age and disability 
benefits, and 17 percent for family and children CCTs). 2 Indeed, the Green Card is one 
of the SA programs in ECA – together with the child allowance program in Russia –
displaying the highest coverage among the poor (Figure 6).  
  
                                                 
2
 According to administrative statistics from the ministry of Health, as of September 2008 the total 
number of Green Card holders in Turkey was around 9,4 million (Aran, 2009) . 
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Figure 6: The Green Card is one on the Programs in ECA with the largest coverage rates 
among the poor.   
 
Source: Lindert (2009) and Nguyen and Sundaram (2009) 
 
4. A closer look to the Green Card Program 
 
Besides being the most generous SA program, the Green Card constitutes the main 
source of health insurance for the poorest households in Turkey. Since Turkey is 
moving towards achieving universal health coverage, the share of the population with 
access to health insurance has increased significantly in recent years. This has occurred 
through an expansion in both the contributory and non-contributory health schemes. 
Between 2003 and 2006, coverage of contributory insurance schemes (SSK, Emekli 
Sandigi and Bagkur) expanded from 40.6 to 47.6 million individuals. In the same period, 
the total number of individuals with access to the Green Card increased from 2.5 million 
in 2003 to 10.2 million in 2006 according to HBS 2006 data (Aran and Hentschel, 2008). 
As a result of the expansion, the percentage of population in 2006 not covered by any 
kind of health insurance declined to less than 20 percent nationally. The Green Card is 
the main source of health insurance for the poorest households in Turkey (Figure 7). 
Indeed, without the Green Card, a large majority of the population in the poorest 2 
deciles would not have health insurance. As such, the Green Card seems to be providing 
an important social service to the poor.  
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Figure 7: Health Coverage by Socio-Economic Status [Turkey, 2006] 
 
Source: Aran and Hentschel (2008) 
 
The Green Card program design provides some extra “incentives” for individuals to 
remain in the informal sector. Besides the fact that all SA programs in Turkey described 
in this note require beneficiaries be unregistered in social security (i.e. in the informal 
sector), the Green Card program may have some other design factors that could 
potentially affect individual choices to remain in the informal sector. First, Green Card 
beneficiaries do not have copayments for in-patient and out-patient care, while 
beneficiaries from the contributory health system do have to pay co-payments (albeit 
small). Second, there is no time limit for enjoying Green Card benefits. As long as 
individuals remain eligible (i.e. informal and poor), they can benefit from the program. 
Third, moving to a “formal” job poses a risk for individuals to eventually lose their access 
to health insurance. Anecdotal evidence suggest that some Green Card beneficiaries 
perceive that getting a formal job may be risky, since some workers are laid-off before 
one year of service. This occurs because after 12 months of formal employment 
employees become eligible to severance payment protection. Since individuals who 
move from the informal to the formal sector must give up their Green Card, they 
become somehow exposed to the risk of being laid off and uninsured.  Obtaining a new 
Green Card may take 8 to 10 months, during which individuals and their families would 
be out of any health insurance scheme.  
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Green Card beneficiaries utilize more health services than non-beneficiaries, 
conditional on being poor. As illustrated in Figure 8, Green Card beneficiaries display 
slightly higher doctor/hospital utilization than non-beneficiaries, conditional on being 
poor.3 This may occur because Green Card holders are likely to be in the poorest 
segment of the population and thus be more likely to be sick. Furthermore, estimates 
using the 2006 HBS data (Aran and Hentschel, 2008) indicate that, on average, 
households who have access to health insurance (either SSI or Green Card)  spend less 
on health, especially among the poor. This suggests that without insurance schemes 
poor individuals would likely spend more out-of-pocket to pay for health services, which 
would in turn contribute to higher poverty rates.  
 
Figure 8: Health expenditures and Utilization by Insurance Type [Turkey, 2006] 
 
 
 
Source: Aran and Hentschel (2008) and authors own elaboration using the WB 
informality Survey. 
 
But some beneficiaries may be abusing the system.  While the Green Card program 
seems to be an important source of healthcare among the poor, there may be some 
abuses to the system. Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates that some individuals may 
actually have double coverage (social security and Green Card). This may occur, for 
example, when a young woman (living in a household eligible to the Green Card 
program) gets married and her husband works in the formal sector. In cases like this, 
individuals may have the incentive to keep her Green Card in order to avoid some of the 
co-payments that are required by the contributory health system. Indeed, regional data 
indicates that in some municipalities the share of the population covered in the 
contributory and/or in the non-contributory health system surpasses 100 percent 
(suggesting double coverage) (Figure 9).   
  
                                                 
3
 Poor households in the WB informality survey are defined as those with an income level lower than 900 
YTL per month.   
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Figure 9: Share of the Population with any Type of Health Coverage [December 2008] 
 
 
Source: SGK 
 
 
5.  Estimating the Impact of the Green Card on Informality   
 
In this section, we test empirically whether the Green Card program is actually 
contributing to higher informality in Turkey.  As it has been presented in sections 3 and 
4, the Green Card program displays some features that could potentially affect workers 
decisions to remain in the informal sector. In order to test empirically such association, 
we use the eligibility requirement of having an income less than one third of the 
minimum wage in order to qualify for the program as a basis for our analysis. Those 
individuals lying close enough to the cutoff point are expected to be quite similar in 
terms of the relevant attributes, except for qualifying or not for the program. Hence, by 
comparing them we can evaluate the impact of Green Card in different dimensions. This 
popular identification strategy is known as “discontinuity design” (Box 2).  In our case, 
the discontinuity refers to the eligibility threshold (i.e. the income threshold established 
in order to target the program). Naturally, we cannot draw causal inference by 
comparing the extremely poor with the rich. However, as we get closer to cutoff point, 
the individuals become (on average) more similar in terms of their attributes. Those 
who are marginally above the threshold are comparable to those who are marginally 
below the threshold and, therefore, can be used as a reasonable comparison group. 
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Box 2.  Identification strategy: the regression discontinuity design  
 
The design of Green Card allows us to exploit a popular identification strategy: the regression 
discontinuity design. This methodology, introduced during the 1960s by Thistlewaite and Campbell, was 
not spread in the economic literature until recently, in the late 1990s. The main idea is simple. In certain 
contexts the assignment to a treatment is a discontinuous function of an observable covariate. The 
treatment depends on whether the value of this covariate is above or below a certain threshold, and 
people cannot self select into treatment by altering their behavior to achieve such threshold. Those 
observations lying close enough to the cutoff point are expected to be quite similar in terms of the 
relevant attributes, allowing to draw causal inference by comparing them. Frequently, these thresholds 
for treatment arise with the eligibility conditions imposed by governments dealing with scarce resources 
and the search of transparence in the assignment of social programs.   
 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) compile many examples of recent studies taking advantage of these kinds of 
designs. Among them, van der Klaauw’s (2008) carry out an evaluation of a compensatory education 
programs on student performance in New York City public schools during the 1993, 1997, and 2001 school 
years.  He takes advantage of the discontinuity in the rule that determines eligibility: schools with poverty 
counts above the district average qualify for the program, while the rest do not. So this provides the basis 
of a regression discontinuity evaluation, since all schools near the average have comparable poverty 
counts, but their treatment status differ. Other interesting example is found in Chen and van der Klaauw’s 
(2009). This paper assesses the work disincentive effects of the Disability program during the 1990s in the 
United States, exploiting the fact that the eligibility determination process is based in part on the age of 
individuals. They exploit this age discontinuity to estimate the impact on labor supply for an important 
subset of applicants. 
 
 
Estimates do not provide evidence of an “informality” discontinuity at the threshold, 
suggesting that the Green Card program is not affecting sector choice, at least at the 
aggregate level. Figure 10 displays the relationship between household per capita 
income (X axis) and the expected probability of working in the informal sector (Y axis) as 
estimated by a locally weighted regression (at a per-capita income percentile level). The 
dependent variable is the share of workers that are not registered with social security 
institutions in each percentile. The independent variable is the percentile of household 
per capita income. The sample excludes households who have motor vehicle, since this 
is generally a condition that disqualifies individuals from obtaining SA. The vertical line 
plotted in this figure stands for the Green Card eligibility income threshold (i.e. one third 
of the minimum wage, as defined by law). Not surprisingly, estimates indicate a negative 
relation between income and informality (i.e. informality decreases as per-capita 
household income increases). Estimates do not provide evidence of a discontinuity at 
the threshold, suggesting that the program may not be introducing significant 
distortions on the probability of working in the informal sector around the eligibility 
income level. Similar results are obtained when controlling by observable characteristics 
and employing different econometrics techniques (such as linear partial regressions and 
probit regression models) (results available upon request).  
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Figure 9:  Locally weighted regressions: informality and household per capita income 
 
Source: Authors own estimates using 2006 HBS 
 
But there are important caveats to using this method in the Turkey context. In theory, 
the eligibility criteria for SA programs are to not be registered in social security and to 
live in a household whose per-capita income is below one third of the net minimum 
wage. In practice, the eligibility criteria vary across municipal offices. As such, it is 
actually uncertain where exactly the “eligibility threshold” is in the household per-capita 
income distribution. Analysis indicates that the relationship between informal 
employment and household per-capita income is rather smooth and there are no drastic 
changes (like spikes or kinks) along the per-capita income distribution, except at the 
very beginning of the distribution where most workers are informal anyway. As such, 
results may be inconclusive. Generally, SA programs are targeted to individuals who are 
eligible according to a pre-determined definition. In order to determine the impact of a 
program on labor market outcomes, one would compare individuals who get the 
program (treatment group) with very similar individuals who do not get the program 
(control group) given that they are eligible to receive the program. Unfortunately, 
analyzing the effects of the green card program on informality through non-
experimental techniques is practically impossible because there is not an available 
control group (i.e. the outcome of interest – informality – is at the same time one of the 
program’s eligibility requirements). 
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We also analyze the Impact of a continuous expansion of Green Card spending on 
“aggregate” informality, using a partial equilibrium model of two sectors with an 
endogenous formal sector. The model assumes that shocks in the economy (such as 
higher expenditures on SA and/or changes in the labor costs, among others) generate 
incentives for workers and firms to move in and out of informality. Among other 
assumptions, in the model firms and workers adjust behavior to changes in SA benefits 
offered to workers in the informal sector while firms and workers adjust behavior to 
changes in non-wage labor costs and benefits offered to workers in the formal sector 
(Box 3). The model used here assumes that workers have the choice to move freely 
across sectors with no “migration” costs involved, looking for higher wages relative to 
their productivity levels (i.e. markets are integrated, not segmented). However, the 
Turkish labor market in Turkey may actually be segmented. As such, results provided by 
the equilibrium model are likely to have an upper-bias.   
 
Box 3.  Equilibrium Model Assumptions, Robayo (2009) 
 
Formal Sector: 
(i) Firms in the formal sector have to pay mandatory social security contributions and adjust 
their demand for labor to changes in these non-wage labor costs (I.e. Firms in the formal 
sector adjust their employment growth based on the growth in wages and in non-wage labor 
costs relative to productivity). 
(ii) Firms in the formal sector have a production function that displays Constant Returns to Scale 
(CRS) (Taymaz, 2009) 
(iii) Workers in the formal sector are registered in a social security institution and are paid the 
value of their productivity (i.e. they work in a competitive labor market setting).  
(iv) Workers in the formal sector have to pay mandatory social security contributions to have 
access to some services (health, pension, unemployment insurance, etc.) and value these 
non-wage labor benefits based on the perception of the quality of the services offered. 
Informal Sector: 
(i) Firms in the informal sector are not subject to social security contributions, neither covered 
by labor laws; therefore labor costs are only constituted by wages. 
(ii) Workers in the informal sector do not pay social security contributions but instead receive 
social assistance from the government, in particular subsidize health (Green Card). 
Movements across sectors: 
(i) The cost of social contributions as well as worker’s valuation of these benefits may affect 
workers’ decisions of whether to remain formal, or to move to the informal sector.   
(ii) Non-contributory assistance (i.e. benefits at no extra cost) may cause perverse incentives to 
remain in the informal sector. Workers may prefer to work in the informal sector instead of 
the formal sector depending on the elasticity of substitution between sectors, the degree of 
mobility across sectors and the degree of labor market segmentation, as well as the 
subjective valuation of such services).  
Other Assumptions of the Labor Market 
(i) A faster growth in wage and non-wage labor costs relative to productivity affect negatively 
employment growth.   
(ii) There is an involuntary initial unemployment by frictions. 
(iii) There is free movement between the formal and the informal sectors (i.e. no dual labor 
market/labor market segmentation).  
(iv) There is real wage flexibility in the labor markets. Markets adjust to shocks partially through 
wages. 
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Simulations also indicate that an expansion in SA investments may impact informality 
only marginally. After calibrating the parameters of the model, we simulated the impact 
of higher SA spending on informality.4 In particular, we simulate a similar increase in 
Green Card spending as that observed between 2004 and 2007 (i.e. a 170 percent 
increase in Green Card spending – equivalent to 313 percent in increase in the share of 
“Green Card” transfers as a share of gross wages). Not surprisingly, higher investment 
on SA would contribute to higher informality. Somehow surprisingly, results indicate the 
effects of a large increase in SA spending would increase informality only marginally 
(from 0.450 to 0.464 at most). As presented in Figure 11, the effects of the simulated 
policy on informality are larger if workers have a higher valuation of the Green Card (as 
it is probably the case in Turkey) and to the extent that labor supply is more elastic (i.e. 
more responsive to changes in wage and non-wage costs).  
 
Figure 10: Impact of Higher Green Card Expenditure on the Size of the Informal Sector 
 
Source: Authors own calculation. L.S.E: Labor Supply Elasticity 
 
The reason why the Green Card program (or its expansion) is not affecting informality 
by much is probably due to a large formal/informal wage gap. Evidence suggests that 
the formal and informal labor markets in Turkey display large wage differentials that are 
not explained by worker’s productivity. Indeed, previous work (Angel-Urdinola, 2009) 
finds that controlling for observable characteristics such as education, sector of 
employment, and age – among others –; workers in the informal sector are expected to 
earn hourly wages that are 40 percent lower than those of otherwise similar workers in 
the formal sector. Such differences in wages could be due to the existence of 
                                                 
4
 The model was calibrated with the following parameters: Labor supply elasticity: 0.1, 0.5, and 1 (Based 
on Taymaz, 2009 and consistent with Hamermesh, 1993 and Killingsworth, 1983). Output elasticity of 
labor: 0.17/0.23 (Based on Hamermesh, 1993and consistent with Betcherman and Pages, 2007) 
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segmentation in the labor market, whereby low mobility across sector make individuals 
queue in the uncovered sector with the hope of eventually getting a job in the covered 
sector. However, there is not “hard” empirical evidence that this is the case in Turkey.  
To make this finding more visible, the left panel of Figure 12 plots the “net” labor 
income distribution for workers in the formal and informal sectors. As illustrated by the 
Graph, formal workers earn much more than informal workers at all points of the 
distribution. The right panel of Figure 12 computes the average labor income for formal 
and informal workers for workers in the neighborhood of Green Card eligibility 
threshold (i.e. plus/minus 10 percent of the Green Card eligibility threshold). Results 
indicate that the formal/informal wage gap is so large, that even after accounting for 
the Green Card transfers, workers in the formal sector would earn “net” wages that are 
much higher than “gross wages” (accounting for Green Card benefits) in the informal 
sector. As such, low-income workers who have a chance to move from the informal 
sector to the formal sector would have string incentives to do so even if this would 
imply losing all SA benefits (i.e. the expected wage gains of moving to formality would 
by far surpass the “monetary” benefits provided by SA transfers by staying in 
informality).       
 
Figure 12:  The formal/informal wage differential in Turkey so large that Green Card 
transfers (albeit generous) may not influence worker’s sector choice.  
 
Source: Authors own elaboration using 2006 HBS data.  
Note: Graphs plot “net” labor income. 
 
But there is a “risk” factor that may create incentives for some workers to remain in 
the informal sector, if they believe they may get fired soon after they obtain formal 
employment. According to data from a World Bank informality survey, only 2 out of 
every 10 uneducated workers in the urban labor market (at all age groups) transition 
from the informal to the formal sector. When doing so, workers (and their dependents) 
must give up their Green Card benefits. At the same time, workers face the risk to be 
laid off from formal employment before one year of service. As mentioned before, this 
occurs because after 12 months of service workers become eligible to severance 
payment protection. If the worker is laid off, he would need to re-apply for a Green 
Card. Obtaining a new Green Card may take between 8 and 10 months.  If the worker 
5,294
1,766
636
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
Formal Workers Informal Workers
TY
L 
p
e
r 
ye
ar
Greencard Per-capita transfer
Average Labor Income
22 
 
values health coverage highly – more than he values the additional wage he would earn 
in  the formal sector – and believes that the probability of being laid off before one year 
is high; the worker may choose to remain working informally to avoid the risk of 
becoming uncovered. This may occur when individuals (and/or their dependents) are 
frequent users of health services and/or have delicate health conditions. However, it is 
difficult to quantify with the data at hand how many individuals could face such 
dilemma, and more analysis is needed to answer this question.   
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In theory, a generous SA program designed to benefit workers in the informal sector of 
the economy – such as Turkey’s Green Card program – could generate perverse 
incentives for workers to remain in the informal sector and/or not to search for formal 
jobs. In practice, however, the distortion can be small. This could happen if the supply of 
formal jobs is very limited for a typical SA recipient. This would imply that SA recipients 
would face a small chance of finding a formal job in any case so that the disincentives 
would not alter individual’s behaviors. Also, the impact of generous SA transfers may be 
limited in the context of segmented markets whereby wage gap between formal and 
informal workers is so large that, even after paying the social insurance contributions, 
formal workers earn much more. The latest seem to be a plausible explanation of why a 
rapid expansion of SA transfers in Turkey may not contribute to higher informality in the 
labor market.  
 
Results in this note indicate that even though SA transfers in Turkey (and mainly the 
Green Card) display some features that could potentially influence worker’s sector 
choice, in practice this is not the case. This occurs because the formal/informal wage 
gap is so large, that even after accounting for the SA transfers, workers in the formal 
sector would earn wages that are much higher than those in the informal sector.  
However, some workers may have incentives remain in the informal sector if they 
believe they may get fired soon after they obtain formal employment, thus being at 
“risk” to becoming uncovered for some time. This may occur when individuals (and/or 
their dependents) are frequent users of health services and/or have delicate health 
conditions. 
 
Although the Green Card program seem to be achieving its main purpose very well (i.e. 
provision of subsidized healthcare to the poor), future expansions of the program could 
avoid possible abuses of the system that could arise due to targeting deficiencies and/or 
incentives for some individuals to have double health coverage. As Turkey moves into 
achieving universal healthcare, the role of the non-contributory health sector (Green 
Card) will become more and more important. As such, it becomes important to revise, 
standardize, and make transparent across municipalities the eligibility criteria to benefit 
from the Green Card program. In a more general context, it could be beneficial to 
consider whether being “unregistered” in social security should continue to be a 
requirement to SA eligibility.  
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